

A Country Dangerous for Discipline: The Clash and Combination of Regular and Irregular Warfare during the French and Indian War

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Abstract

This article argues that the reason that the British were victorious in the French and Indian War in the North American theatre was not due to their having superior military technology or deeper pockets than the French, but due to their leadership and military tactics on the battlefield. While both the French and British campaigns engaged in irregular, or guerrilla, and regular warfare, the British combined both tactics into a hybrid way of war that proved superior on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the inability of the French to combine these two strategies made them the weaker, despite being more skilled at irregular warfare. The guerrilla warfare tactics developed during this war would prove to be timeless, reappearing later in America's military history in the Revolutionary War, the Vietnam War, and more recently in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Introduction

Guerrilla warfare became a highly important topic of discussion during the Vietnam War. The United States and South Vietnam without a doubt had more firepower and weapons than North Vietnam, yet the Americans and South Vietnamese struggled to stay afloat against the North Vietnamese. More recently, in the past decade, U.S. troops were again challenged by guerrilla warfare tactics used by the Iraqi insurgency in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. These conflicts proved that it not only mattered which side possessed better firearms technology, but also which side better executed guerrilla warfare tactics. The impact of guerrilla warfare tactics and the decisive role it

played in war is engraved in American history. Guerrilla warfare, at the time referred to as irregular warfare, was significant in the outcome of the French and Indian War from 1754-1763. While both of the French and British campaigns did incorporate guerrilla tactics into their military operations, it would be the British forces and the American colonists' hybrid implementation of such irregular tactics combined with the "regular," traditional European tactics that would result in a decisive victory on the North American front of this war.

What is guerrilla warfare? The etymology of the word originates from the Spanish term "guerrilla" which means little war. Although the term was coined during the Spanish resistance to French occupation in the early 1800's, the strategy itself is ancient. In today's United States military, guerrilla warfare is classified as unconventional warfare. This "little war" consists of light infantry that moves swiftly and employs hit-and-run tactics. These same tactics are used by modern-day U.S. Special Forces, specifically the Army Rangers. North American guerilla tactics were first developed during the French and Indian War by a colonial soldier, Major Robert Rogers, founder of the Rangers. However, during this time, such military tactics were referred to as 'uncivilized,' 'savage,' 'mountain,' 'frontier,' 'indian,' and 'irregular' warfare.²²⁹ No matter the name, guerrilla warfare was an extremely important tactic to both sides of the war and, arguably, one of the deciding factors of Great Britain's victory.

Historiography

Max Boot, a modern military historian, argues against the preeminent American myth that, "independence from Great Britain was won by plucky Yankees armed with rifles who picked off befuddled redcoats too dense to deviate from the ritualistic parade-ground warfare of Europe."²³⁰ He calls it an exaggeration because

²²⁹ This paper will refer to guerrilla warfare as irregular warfare and the traditional European tactics as regular warfare for the sake of organization and consistency purposes.

²³⁰ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (United States: Liveright, 2013), Kindle Locations 1321-1322, Kindle Edition.

by the time of the American Revolution, Great Britain had several experiences in irregular warfare. Boot mentions Great Britain's battles with the Scottish Highlanders and Austrian pandours in Europe, with the Jamaican maroons in the Caribbean, and with the Native Americans in North America. It was not that the British forces did not know how to combat irregular warfare, but it was simply not a lasting military strategy. This reveals the British forces' hesitation to use such tactics in both the Revolutionary War and the French and Indian War. The ambushes and methods were considered uncivilized by Great Britain's military leadership as such tactics went against conventional warfare and the internationally accepted Laws of War.

'Laws of War' was the term used to identify various conventions that placed a restraint on certain types of warfare. It would slowly gain recognition in Europe beginning a century and a half before 1700.²³¹ Laws of War included the protection of civilians and humane treatment of the wounded and prisoners. These laws also include the conduct of belligerent actors, as those in combat must meet certain requirements, such as wearing a distinctive uniform so one can identify the soldier versus the harmless civilian. These were considered 'honors of war,' which the British forces held in the highest regard. However, those who used guerrilla tactics in the war did not abide by these standards. The Native Americans in the French and Indian War would show no mercy towards captured colonists and soldiers. The most horrendous example is the massacre of Fort William Henry in 1757. Here, against French orders, the Native American forces brutally killed and tortured all of hostages in the fort. For this, and many other similar atrocities committed by the Native Americans during this conflict, the American colonists and the British soldiers showed them no mercy during and after the war. Those who used guerrilla tactics, such as the American colonists, did not dress in the conventional uniforms of the British armies, so it was harder for the enemy to identify them before the ambushes. This was also considered dishonorable to the British, but dishonorable or

²³¹ Stephen Brumwell, *White Devil* (London: The Orion Publishing Group Ltd, 2004), 291.

not, European tactics alone were not enough to win a war in the New World. Elliot A. Cohen asserts, “If the British could win the war by storming the citadel at Quebec with a conventional army and doing nothing else, they could defeat the French without mastering the arts of wilderness warfare. But such a campaign would be hazardous in the extreme.”²³² By this time, both the Canadian and American colonists were accustomed to irregular warfare. Such tactics had become common practice when fighting the Native Americans. The British had to acknowledge this aspect of New World warfare in order to succeed. The fact that the American colonists adapted guerrilla tactics made them far superior soldiers than the British troops during the French and Indian War. If it were not for the change of leadership, early failures of British failures on the battlefield, and the fact that the colonists were already utilizing guerrilla tactics, Great Britain would have been less likely to adapt the guerrilla tactics as successfully as they did towards the end of the war. In a way, Boot is right in his assertion that Great Britain was not oblivious to guerrilla tactics. Such tactics were not disregarded during the Revolutionary War, but rather the British were hesitant to use them and that hesitation would cost them the war and their North American empire.

Many historians have touched on the adoption of guerrilla warfare by the imperial powers, France and Great Britain, but no one has yet truly analyzed why one side’s adoption of the tactics worked better than the other- specifically Great Britain’s over France’s in their use of a hybrid military system that combined both irregular and regular warfare successfully.

The Beginnings of War

The French and Indian War was a power struggle between two of the world’s largest and most powerful empires, France and Great Britain. The New World was

²³² Eliot A. Cohen, *Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*, (New York: Free Press, 2011), 85-86.

full of rich, abundant resources that were invaluable to both empires. Globally, this conflict included many other countries, with Prussia, Hanover, and Portugal on the side of Great Britain and Austria, Russia, Spain, and Sweden on the side of France. These actors were involved in the war's other fronts in Europe, South America, Africa, India, and the Philippines. During seven years of war, Great Britain and its allies would nearly eliminate the French Navy, making it almost impossible for France to send supplies to its troops and its colonists in New France, or rather, the French holdings in the New World. At this time, France was not experiencing the same financial success as Great Britain and the annihilation of its navy while fighting on multiple fronts would exhaust the French military, giving the British and American troops in the New World an extreme advantage.

Despite mixed loyalties among the Native Americans, each actor in the New World theatre was fighting for a different cause. France wanted control of the Ohio River Valley for its fur trade and so they built forts that extended from the Gulf of St Lawrence to the Mississippi River Delta. The presence of French colonists so close in proximity to the American colonists would naturally cause disputes in between the two. There was another actor present in the Ohio River Valley: the Iroquois Confederation was also well-established in the area. While the Iroquois wanted to remain neutral throughout the early stages of the conflict, they also wanted to protect their land. To this end, they played France and Great Britain off one another in a strategy that historians such as Fred Anderson have referred to as "aggressive neutrality."²³³ The American colonists wanted to expand past the Ohio River Valley and the Mississippi Delta, but both the presence of the French and Iroquois hindered them from doing so. Although Great Britain did not find the land past the Appalachian Mountains valuable, Parliament still sent a minimal number of troops and supplies to help aid the American colonists. Essentially this dispute over land would escalate from a regional conflict to a global conflict.

²³³ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (United States: Faber and Faber, 2000), 16.

The Native Americans

Native Americans were the masters of wilderness warfare. Irregular tactics were already habitual to them, and they also became more refined as Native Americans learned to defend themselves against the new European settlers. Because native technologies were no match to European gunpowder technology, the Native Americans' best weapon was the element of surprise. For years, the Native Americans would terrorize the colonists with their surprise ambushes and attacks.

They come like foxes through the woods, which afford them concealment and serve them as an impregnable fortress. They attack like lions, and, as their surprises are made when they are least expected, they meet with not resistance. They take flight like birds, disappearing before they have really appeared.²³⁴

By the time of the French and Indian War, both the British and French realized what an invaluable ally the Native Americans would be for their own campaigns. Both sides quickly sought out an alliance with the respected regional tribes. Although the skillset of the Native Americans would be indispensable, they would prove to be the French and British's best and worst allies. The Native Americans were not loyal to any one campaign instead they made alliances with whoever was convenient for them at the time. Also, the tribes were vastly fragmented amongst themselves. With so many significant divisions between all of the tribes, it would be impossible for them to survive without European allies. At the beginning of the war, the French had many diplomatic victories against the British in terms of gaining Native American allies. But as the French's military

²³⁴ Ruben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791* (Cleveland, Ohio: Burrows Brothers, 1896-1901).

leadership started to flounder, the Native Americans quickly changed alliances and fought for the British campaign. The British, historically known for making promises they did not intend to keep, promised the Native Americans that if they allied themselves with the British, the American colonists would not settle past certain points so the Native Americans could live in peace. New-France Governor Vaudreuil wrote in a letter about the Native Americans, “We shall never be able to make those Indians move according to our desires.”²³⁵ Throughout the seven years of the war, tribes were constantly jumping back and forth between sides. Despite this, “Canadians were certain that their strongest weapon against the encroachments of the far more populous British settlers from the south had always been their Native American Allies.”²³⁶ Perhaps this reliance on the fickle Native Americans was a large part why the French would ultimately fail in the New World theatre against the British. The British knew that while the Native Americans were powerful allies, they could not rely solely on their ally’s skill at wilderness warfare. In order to be successful, the British would need their own wilderness combat force. Despite these obvious hesitations, if the alliance with the Native American tribe was kept, which was seldom, it would normally prove to be fruitful due to Native Americans’ role as masters of irregular warfare.

The French Campaign

During the early years of the war, the French displayed superior battle tactics on the frontier of North America. While both the British and the French had Indian allies, the French still had more allies than the British. The Canadian colonists were largely outnumbered by the American colonists so their alliances with the Native American tribes became a key advantage in the early stages of the war. The native raids could push back the American colonists towards the coastal cities in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Meanwhile, the Canadian colonists

²³⁵ Vaudreuil to Berryer, 30 March 1759, Montreal, in O’Callaghan and Fernow, Documents, X:951.

²³⁶ Dan Snow, *Death or Victory*, (United Kingdom: Harper Press, 2010), 48.

would supply the Native Americans with muskets, powder, knives, food and paid them in brandy and gold.²³⁷ Many Canadian military officers even learned the native languages and dressed and painted themselves like the Native Americans so that it would be hard to tell the difference between the two. This willingness to adapt the other's culture instilled a trust between the two sides.

This alliance would prove to be truly threatening to the British colonists because the Canadian colonists had no problems adapting the warfare tactics of the Native Americans: "For generations Canada had defended herself from Native Americans and British settlers alike by adopting the former [savage warfare]."²³⁸ The Canadian colonists also adopted scalping the British enemies as tokens and gifts for their Native American counterparts. The Native Americans accepted the French forts as a necessary evil to ensure, in exchange for fur, the flow of gunpowder, muskets, and metal from the French.²³⁹ However, they did not view the French as a superior power, nor did they view them as long-term neighbors. The Native Americans' view on the French Canadian colonists was that any rivalry could wait until they defeated their ultimate enemy, the British. Since the French and the British were both against sending massive amounts of regular troops at the beginning of this war, the guerrilla tactics and the alliances between the Canadian colonists and the Native Americans performed together proved to be detrimental for the British campaign.

This way of fighting changed in 1756 when the French sent Louis-Joseph de Montcalm as the new commander of the North American forces. He was shocked at the difference of the country and warfare saying, "everything is so different from European practice."²⁴⁰ The practice of guerrilla, or as he describes it, irregular, warfare was not at all glorious or honorable to the French military. Montcalm was unable to escape the European war mindset and adapt to the American one, which

²³⁷ Ibid., 48.

²³⁸ Ibid., 47.

²³⁹ Ibid., 53.

²⁴⁰ Eccles, *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, 459.

he thought was barbaric. He was worried about the effect this type of warfare would have on his regiment. "Soldiers, by the example of the Indians and Canadians breathing an air permeated with independence...this country is dangerous for discipline."²⁴¹ The raids, ambushes, massacres, and farm burnings were normal practices for the Native Americans the Canadian colonists, but horrified a French military used to fighting in a 'civilized' manner and abiding by the Laws of War. Montcalm pushed for a new era of warfare away from these barbaric practices: "The Canadians thought they were making war, and were making, so as to speak, hunting excursions. Indians formed the basis; now the accessory."²⁴² Montcalm had no intention of using guerrilla warfare as he thought it to be worthless and below his dignity.

Montcalm underestimated irregular warfare. He overlooked the utility of irregular warfare tactics, such as raids and surprise attacks, in two ways. Firstly, he believed in the inflated accounts of British strength and did not give irregular warfare enough credit for its attritional effect. Secondly, he ignored the psychological impact of the attacks. The terror instilled in the British soldiers who experienced the French's surprise attacks. This was perhaps Montcalm's most potent weapon, but he did little to exploit it. Historian Dan Snow critiqued Montcalm's leadership, "A more adaptable, free thinking commander would have spent time considering how to use the techniques of ambush and raiding to inflict greater casualties on the British and grind down their morale."²⁴³

His conservatism on the battlefield would clash with Canadian-born Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil de Cavagnal, Marquis de Vaudreuil, Governor and Lieutenant General of New France. Vaudreuil had very positive and strong relations with the local Native tribes and encouraged irregular warfare, much to the dissatisfaction of French officers. For this, many French officers, including

²⁴¹ E.P. Hamilton, ed., *Adventure de Bougainville, 1756-1760*, (Norman, OK, 1990), 102.

²⁴² E.B. O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, *Documents*, X:959; Montcalm to Le Normand, 12 April 1759, *ibid.*, X:966

²⁴³ Dan Snow, *Death or Victory*, 160-161.

Montcalm, wrote him off for being ‘too Canadian’ and did not take his leadership seriously. Vaudreuil’s bold policy of raids and ambushes into British held-territories were remarkably successful in the early stages of the war. He would bribe the Native Americans with gold, goods, and brandy to push back into vulnerable British settlements. These ambushes of the Canadians and Natives would push American colonists hundreds of miles back towards the coast. Due to the hands-off approach of France in the early years of the war, the Canadians’ method of irregular warfare dominated the North American theatre. It would be the influx of more leaders and troops from France that would cause the downfall of the French campaign.

The massacre at Fort William Henry effectively illustrates the difference in thinking between the French colonists and the French army under Montcalm. Fort William Henry was a highly strategic outpost for the British and provincial armies. It was the northernmost outpost and a tremendous threat to the French. “The question was not ‘if the French would attack’, but rather, ‘when.’”²⁴⁴ In January of 1757, Montcalm ordered Vaudreuil to burn, “at least, the outer parts of the fort,” using 800 troops under a regular officer, Colonel Francois-Charles de Broulmaque.²⁴⁵ Vaudreuil, who often clashed with Montcalm’s leadership, decided on a much larger attack that was led by his brother. This included a 1,600 man force consisting of 200-250 French regulars, 300 Troupes de la Marine, 650 Canadian militia, and 400 Indians (The Indians were recruited from various tribes).²⁴⁶ He would also provide the force with the appropriate equipment and insights of the eighteenth-century wilderness warfare. So although this operation was on a much larger scale than the average lighter infantry missions, the customs were still very similar. The French were successful in seizing Fort William Henry as

²⁴⁴ Russell P. Bellico, *Empires in the Mountains: French and Indian War Campaigns and Forts in the Lake Champlain, Lake George, and Hudson River Corridor*, (New York: Purple Mountain Press: 2010), 97.

²⁴⁵ E.B. O’Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 10 vols. (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1853-1858), 10:551.

²⁴⁶ Russell P. Bellico, *Empires in the Mountains: French and Indian War Campaigns and Forts in the Lake Champlain, Lake George, and Hudson River Corridor*, 100.

the British quickly surrendered to prevent the possibility of high casualties. The French and the British made an agreement that the French would escort the British troops home, but before this was set in stone, Montcalm wanted to be sure that their Native American allies understood. The Native Americans were furious that they were not going to be able to kill and collect the British scalps as they were promised. The Native Americans were hungry for blood so while the French were away, they marched into the fort, killing and injuring about 200 British soldiers who remained. Montcalm quickly responded to prevent more deaths, but by this time, it was too late. This massacre further strained the trust between the French and the Native Americans and the relations were forever poisoned between the French and the British. It would be this massacre and other failures on the British's side of the fight that would call for a new strategy and leadership in the North American theatre.

The British Campaign

In 1756, the Earl of Loudoun was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the British forces. Loudoun was the blame for many of the devastating failures for the British. He refused to cooperate with the American colonists and military and, just like his French counterparts, despised irregular warfare. In December of 1756, Loudoun was called back to England for poor performance and replaced with William Pitt. Pitt would change the strategies of the British navy and the war strategies on the frontier. His goal was to capture Quebec, which would ultimately lead to victory in the war. He was controversial because, unlike the other European military officers, he strongly encouraged the British forces to field as many rangers as possible.²⁴⁷ By 1759, there were more rangers in British pay than ever before.²⁴⁸

Much like the Canadian colonists, the American colonists had many years of

²⁴⁷ The Rangers was a light infantry unit that was quickly deployable and tasked mainly with intelligence operations. The rangers were founded under Major Robert Rogers and later adopted as its own unit in the British Army during the French and Indian War.

²⁴⁸ Stephen Brumwell, *White Devil*, 135.

experience with irregular warfare. The adaptation of irregular warfare was the only way they could defend themselves against the Native Americans in the fight over territory. Prior to this war, the American colonists had engaged in and practiced irregular warfare tactics in the three other conflicts: King William's War from 1688-1697, Queen Anne's War from 1702-1713, and finally King George's War from 1744-1748. It is important to note that this seven year conflict was not the only French and Indian war, as it is often referred to, but the fourth and final intercolonial conflict which all together spanned a little over a century. By the time of the fourth French and Indian War, both the Canadian and American colonists had more than enough time and experience to adapt to wilderness fighting, unlike the imperial powers presiding over them.

At the start of the French and Indian War however, the British officers discouraged the American colonists from using the 'uncivilized' tactics. By this time, tensions were already high between the British and the American colonists due to political reasons. The American colonists were enraged that they could not control their own armies the way they preferred and by the fact that the British barely paid them.

William Pitt recognized that if the British were going to win the war, their campaign must incorporate both irregular and regular tactics and capture Quebec. There was the possibility of solely using a conventional army and there being no need to master the arts of wilderness/irregular warfare, but it would extremely hazardous. It would depend,

Not merely on the navigation of St. Lawrence, but on the ability to throw a substantial army ashore, sustain it, and complete the siege of a fortified city in the short campaigning window assured by a wintry climate. Instead, British strategy called for concerted, multi-thrust campaign against Canada. And such advances would require

operations in the forests not just dying on campaigning season, but over several. For armies to survive such campaigns the British need woodland warriors of their own.²⁴⁹

Despite major reluctance by the British army and its officers, the development of light infantry in the British army is traced back to the French and Indian War in North America.²⁵⁰ In regular European style warfare, the role of the infantry units was to deliver mass fire from close enemy lines. They had to be disciplined in order to work under the extreme stresses of combat. The importance of raids, skirmishers, the ability to seize villages, and anything that would delay the enemy's advance was valuable to the campaign. The formations and linear warfare that were so popular in European warfare had become less significant in the North American theatre and had given rise to independence for junior officers and the individual soldiers, forcing superiors to rely on them to make sound and successful choices in battle. However, at the height of the French and Indian War, the regular British army had few officers and men that were suitable for light infantry.

Early on, the British army viewed the provincial, or American, troops, as more effective but poorly disciplined, more expensive than regular troops, and sticklers for their contractual rights. Despite this, the British army viewed the American troops as better in the woods than the English regulars. Robert Rogers, who was in charge of ranger units, was not at all like the British officers' disappointing descriptions of American colonial wilderness fighters. While both the British and the French militaries complained that their irregular warfare soldiers were undisciplined and disorganized, Rogers' Rangers proved their claims to be inaccurate. Although the French's wilderness tactics seemed more effective than the British's, mainly due to the fact that they had more Native Americans on their

²⁴⁹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*, 86.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 87.

side helping and guiding them, what Rogers instilled in his rangers would be instrumental in the wilderness tactics of the French and Indian War and are still relevant in the training of the United States Army Rangers today.

After the Battle on Snowshoes, which precluded France's siege on Fort William Henry, Rogers wrote *Rogers' Rules of Ranging*, a short manual full of tactical common sense. Unlike the French with the Native Americans, Rogers urged his rangers not to rely on his or his men's untrained instance or accumulated experience, but on rules and practices that could formally be communicated, standard operation features that could be conveyed and reinforced in training. Rogers' ranging rules took the focus away from linear, large military operations to smaller, light infantry operations that were able to spy and collect intelligence that would be vital for future counterinsurgency missions. His manual was revolutionary because he attempted to render the art of wilderness warfare as a skill that one could teach and something that was as transmittable as a military doctrine.²⁵¹ While the rangers were not viewed as the ultimate fighting or counter-insurgency force at the time, the foundation laid by Rogers would prove to be vital in the American Revolution for the Americans and for hundreds of years to come in the United States military and its special operations.

Another outlet for the British in their adaption of wilderness warfare was the creation of the Royal American Regiment. This was four battalions made up of provincial soldiers led by British and foreign officers. The British recruited Americans and foreign Protestants from Germany and Switzerland who were specialized woodsmen. These soldiers, the Germans from Pennsylvania, the frontiersmen from New York and Albany, and the British command would make up the rank and file.²⁵² The Royal Americans were very large, but they were only one regiment. Individually, neither the Royal Americans nor the rangers and light

²⁵¹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*, 91.

²⁵² Richard Walden Hale Jr., *The Royal Americans*, (Ann Arbor: William L. Clements Library, 1944), 11.

infantry ever fully managed to match the French and the Native Americans level of irregular warfare. Indeed, alone, the rangers, the Royal Americans, and the light infantry stood absolutely no chance in competing with the French's guerrilla warfare tactics. Together, although the three forces were not elite, they possessed the capability to survive in woodland warfare. When combined with regular warfare tactics, this irregular form of warfare would prove dominant. That capability would prove influential in the British victory. The French, on the other hand, failed to capitalize on this capability due to the clash of leadership in the French military. Of course, the British did not merely win this war on the frontier, but in its naval battles and other battles abroad as well. The key factor in this is that if the British military had not maintained or defended its ground in the North American theatre, than the results of the war could have been extremely different.

Conclusion

Guerrilla, irregular, wilderness, or savage warfare, however one refers to it, such tactics were essential in the British victory in the French and Indian War. While it is true that this was a global war, and that events abroad affected the British ability to defeat the French in the North American theatre, such events were not enough for the British to capture Quebec and win the war. Such operations involved coordination between irregular and regular soldiers, intelligence, and sound leadership. At the beginning of the war, the French had all the advantages because of their alliances with the Native Americans and the wilderness warfare capabilities of their Canadian colonists. The British did possess some Native American alliances and American colonists capable of wilderness combat, but they were at a clear disadvantage compared to the French. As the war progressed however, changes in leadership and attitudes towards the use of guerrilla tactics changed. The French military was horrified by such tactics and was hesitant in combining regular and irregular warfare. As Montcalm put it, once he held the leadership, it was time for the barbaric ways of fighting to end. His constant power struggle with his counter-part, Vaudreuil, would lead to severe fragmentation in

France's later military tactics in the war. Meanwhile, after the many failures and upsets under Lord Loudon for the British, William Pitt took over. It is not enough for one side to have better wilderness tactics and skills than the other. Leaders had to be able to use those skills effectively. Pitt's leadership and decision to combine irregular and regular warfare were monumental for the British. Despite being considered controversial and unconventional by traditionalists, Pitt recognized that the implementation of wilderness warfare was vital to the success of the British campaign in the North American theatre. A New frontier called for new military tactics.

Irregular tactics would serve the American troops better than the British soldiers in the end. As the French and Indian War ended and the tensions between the Americans and the British parliament peaked, conflict broke out about two decades later. The fighting and leadership skills the American colonists learned in this war would be used against the British in the American Revolution. The use of guerrilla tactics and intelligence would also prove to be instrumental in the defeat of the British. Boot argues that the British forgot such tactics when it came time to the American Revolution, but I would argue they, like the French, hesitated to use such warfare because they wanted to be civil. Additionally, they were fighting their country's colonists, among whom much of Britain's former guerrilla skill was concentrated. However, this misconception would turn out to be a grave mistake for the empire. Meanwhile, this victory and the use of such tactics was only the beginning for what would become the world's strongest military.