

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF PHILIP J. JAFFE: A FOREIGNER'S FORAY INTO CHINESE COMMUNISM

Patrick Nichols

“...the capitalist world is divided into two rival sectors, the one in favor of peace and the status quo, and the other the Fascist aggressors and provokers of a new world war.”

These words spoken by Mao Tse Tung to Philip J. Jaffe in a confidential interview.

Although China has long held international relations within its Asian sphere of influence, the introduction of a significant Western persuasion following their defeats in the Opium Wars was the first instance in which China had been subservient to the desires of foreigners. With the institution of a highly westernized and open trading policy per the wishes of the British, China had lost the luster of its dynastic splendor and had deteriorated into little more than a colony of Western powers. Nevertheless, as China entered the 20th century, an age of new political ideologies and institutions began to flourish. When the Kuomintang finally succeeded in wresting control of the nation from the hands of the northern warlords following the Northern Expedition¹, it signaled a modern approach to democratizing China. However, as the course of Chinese political history will show, the KMT was a morally weak ruling body that appeased the imperial intentions of the Japanese at the cost of Chinese citizens and failed to truly assert its political legitimacy during its almost ten year reign. Under these conditions, a radical and highly determined sect began to form within the KMT along with foreign assistance. The party held firmly on the idea of general welfare, but focused mostly on the rights of the working class and student nationalists. With economic policies borrowed from its international brethren, the Chinese Communist Party founded itself upon the ideas of Communism (Marxism) as seen in the Soviet Union. From its birth within independent intellectual student groups at Chinese universities, to its development during seclusion in Shaanxi, the CCP supported activism against the ineffective domestic and international policies of the KMT. As Japan continually encroached upon Chinese borders, and Western powers manipulated China as they saw fit, the CCP declared what would become a civil war against its KMT counterparts. Although pressure from without would not cease, and more accurately would continually mount, the national struggle for China's future had begun.

To comprehend the state of Chinese political affairs from the late Qing Dynasty until the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party after World War II, one must first grasp, in context, the words of Communist revolutionary Mao Tse Tung, “Political power

¹ Hooker, Richard. "Modern China: Nationalist China." *World Civilizations*. 06 June 1999. Washington State University. 2 Apr 2007 <<http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/MODCHINA/NATIONAL.HTM>>.

grows out of the barrel of a gun.”² Mao had come to believe that, after decades of incontrovertible proof from China’s experiences with Western clout and warlords, politics in China very much hinged on who held control over the most dominant armed forces. However, it is also necessary to recognize that revolutions, such as that of Mao and his Communist brethren, are not born out of thin air. They are driven by pervasive ideologies that stimulate activism among the public and arouse an insatiable desire for change in the fundamental aspects of government. This two-pronged path to power has been endlessly probed since the victory of the CCP in the late 1940s, but one essential aspect of the Communist revolution has been partially overlooked, if not significantly neglected: the role of foreign Communist-sympathetic journalists within the mass publications of the newly born Chinese public spectrum. Here we find an invaluable tool for the broad propagandizing goals of the CCP, deemed the “mass movement”³ by Mao himself; seemingly impartial intellectual elites with the power to influence an increasingly literate Chinese citizenry. One clear example of a highly popular periodical with pro-Communist tendencies was *China Today*.

Beginning with its first publication dated September 7, 1933⁴ and continuing well into its second year of existence, *China Today*’s political tendencies were obvious as it consisted mainly of “rewrites of material (we) received on rice paper from the Chinese Communist Party underground in Shanghai.”⁴ Not until its October 1934 issue was there any semblance of “originally” created material by editors or other contributors. Of its initial group of three editors, each had their own distinct foreign ties or origins. First and foremost is Philip J. Jaffe, the subject of this research, who was born and educated in America and published under the pseudonym J.W. Phillips⁴. Next is Chi Ch’ao-ting, a Chinese-born student in America and cousin of Jaffe with strong Communist ties who published under multiple pseudonyms, but primarily as Hansu Chan⁴. Lastly is T.A. Bisson, better known as Frederick Spencer⁴ to *China Today*’s readers, who was eventually alleged to be a Soviet spy during his tenure in the United States Board of Economic Warfare⁵.

Through his affiliation with his colleagues, Jaffe was provided a great deal of experience with and information about the Chinese Communist movement. His greatest ties came through Chi Ch’ao-ting, who was a friend and trusted political ally to Jaffe beyond their familial connection. Although all three editors held highly communistic ideals, Jaffe’s relationship with Chi provided him additional access to the interior machinations of the Kuomintang,

K.P. Ch’en, though not a hundred percent supporter of Chiang Kai-shek was nevertheless in New York to manage China’s credit problems in order to procure materials from the United States, had befriended Chi (Ch’ao-ting) and through

² "Problems of War and Strategy" November 6, 1938. *Selected Works*. Vol. II, p. 224.

³ Tse Tung, Mao. Interview with Philip J. Jaffe. 22 June 1937.

⁴ Jaffe, Philip. *The Amerasia Case From 1945 to the Present*. New York, NY: 1979.

⁵ Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Klehr. *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America*. Yale University Press, 1999.

Ch'en he had become officially and very successfully involved in Kuomintang economic initiatives which, in 1943, led to his becoming confidential secretary and economic adviser to the Chinese Finance Minister H.H. K'ung.⁴

This intimate knowledge of both the CCP and KMT afforded Jaffe a unique perspective of the Chinese Civil War, and further asserted the journalist as an invaluable resource regarding this period of Chinese history. Before venturing further into the issue at hand, it is vital that the circumstances surrounding the Communist-Nationalist struggle be fully detailed.

Faltering from instability within, the ruling Kuomintang government was quickly losing the support of the Chinese public in the tumultuous 1930s. Although their reign would last well into the 1940s, the policies of the preceding decades truly left the government a riddled and hollow shell of its original self. While the CCP made it their prerogative to gain support from the intellectual institutions of China, namely the activist students who originally helped found Communist and Marxist movements within the nation, the Kuomintang lost favor with the ever-radicalizing student groups:

Now the responsibility for eradicating bad government lies with several hundred thousand party troops, and the administration of sixteen provinces is under the direction of Party Headquarters. There are men available for the task. Students should study diligently to equip themselves for great service at a future date.⁶

Furthermore, the KMT held firmly to the idea that the newly mobilized student groups would do nothing but disrupt the political process, "Ts'ai (Yuan-p'ei) concluded that China would incur 'a tremendous loss in the academic realm' if the KMT fostered student political groups."⁶ The divide in policy between the CCP and KMT can be viewed as a precursor to the steadily emerging strength of Chinese communism when related to the ruling party's loss of popularity within student nationalist movements. However, the Kuomintang did not neglect student organizations, and often attempted to work with the groups even while denouncing them. In fact, one of the most influential and competent student groups, the Shanghai Union, was openly sympathetic to the Reorganizationist faction of the KMT.⁶ Although the spokesman of the governing KMT cast aside the necessity of student groups, one of the Shanghai Union's most visible members, Hsia T'ien, acknowledged the ever apparent shift of student support toward the CCP cause and away from what he considered the essence of China,

The spirit of China's people is perishing; this is especially true in the student world. Why? First of all, because Communist deception has corrupted youth and caused universal disorder. Second, because outside forces, pretending to be revolutionary but actually counterrevolutionary and decadent, have not hesitated to sacrifice the true revolutionary elements and wipe out the student movement.

⁶ Israel, John. Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966.

As good Kuomintang members, students must heed Sun Yat-sen's injunction, 'In study, don't forget the revolution.'⁶

As seen here in the words of the prominent student leader in 1928, "outside forces" were seen as playing the utmost significance in the mobilization of student nationalism.

With student groups applying mounting pressure for the KMT to act decisively against Japan, compounded by the party's unwillingness to take any action, the CCP was granted a perfect opportunity. By vocalizing their protests of the Kuomintang's operations toward Japan³, the CCP was able to both position themselves politically in contrast to the failing government as well as align their interests with that of the nationalistic student groups. These student activists and their group affiliations afford a rare glimpse into one aspect vital to the eventual work of Philip Jaffe: a forum within which an influx of political ideologies might be able to instigate uprising or revolt. The CCP's ability to embrace this blossoming player in the political spectrum granted them unbridled access to intellectual youths, a fundamental cog in their rise to power. Along with the actions of the CCP, the ruling Nationalist Party sealed its fate with student activists when the Ministry of Training under the Kuomintang announced two new laws in January of 1930, "The new laws represented a victory for Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei... and Chiang Kai-shek, and a crushing defeat for the Ch'en brothers and the Reorganizationists, as well as for CY, the NSA, the Shanghai Student Union, and all other youthful activists who sought lawful outlets for political expression."⁶ With this legislation, the KMT had dealt a crushing defeat to student political leaders. To further their contradictory reputation within China, the Kuomintang continued to seek the support of students despite their recent restrictive laws. Under a great deal of scrutiny from all sides, obvious cracks in the KMT infrastructure had begun to form by the early 1930s, and they were losing much of their support due to their own limiting legislation.

The contradictions of the Kuomintang's policies likely stemmed from the structural instability within the party itself, "The Kuomintang membership in 1945 was approximately four times that of 1935. Many of the ablest and most forward-looking men in China had joined the Party after the outbreak of the war either for political protection or from patriotic motives. But none of these new members could vote or take any part in formulating the Party's policies. Many of them were strongly opposed to the reactionary policies of the ruling clique."⁷ The complete lack of new ideas or participating members to invigorate the stale and often indecisive Kuomintang left a massive rift within the hierarchy of the party. While the elite KMT policymakers failed to recognize the faults of its appeasement policy regarding Japan, its registered members sought for a shift toward acting immediately against the invading nation's imperial interests.

By the 1940s, the battle lines had been irreversibly drawn between the forces of the CCP and KMT. Mao and his followers gained steam during their seclusion in Shaanxi through the use of publication to achieve his stated goal of a "mass movement,"³ whereas Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist party crumbled under foreign pressures and from their own contradictive policies. Interest from foreign intellectuals soared as the war of

⁷ Jaffe, Philip. New Frontiers in Asia. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1945.

propaganda signaled a definite harbinger of war. Likewise, Communist sympathizers came to China seeking to manipulate the course of the Communist revolution. The topic of this work centers around one such sympathetic journalist whose connections, experiences, and work regarding China and its budding Communist party can be interpreted as some of the most significant of the era. Philip Jaffe, despite his initial naïveté and present historical ambiguity, was a highly visible proponent of Chinese communism whose work would create an indelible mark upon the course of the Chinese Civil War.

When examining the life, work, and influence of Philip Jaffe, one cannot help but be struck by the complete lack of cohesive data surrounding the Communist-leaning intellectual. For a journalist who founded such momentous Communist publications as *China Today* and *Amerasia*, wrote the foreword and commentary on the American translation of Chiang Kai Shek's work China's Destiny, and held a confidential interview with the likes of Mao Tse Tung, it is difficult for one to grasp the reasoning for his lack of historical recognition. Rather than being celebrated by the CCP for his work toward bringing the Communist cause to the forefront in both America and China, the few references to be found regarding Jaffe surround only his accusations in the *Amerasia* and McCarthy trials. Little mention of the work or ties that led to his being questioned is available for even the most determined of researchers. Therefore, this paper will focus instead on the role Jaffe held in augmenting the ability of the CCP to reach the masses preceding, during, and after their underground movement in Shanghai. In order to do so, there must first be a comprehensive outline of the previously highlighted roles of foreigners in the Chinese informative sphere, a group from which Jaffe was previously excluded. Also, there will be time spent organizing the events of Jaffe's life that led to his interest and involvement with communism.

After delving into the topic of foreign interplay during the Kuomintang rule of China (which was a period of great development for the CCP), it is impossible to understate the significance of the influx of new ideas from Western nations, most notably the United States⁸. Further examination of the history of Western journalism and its impact within China often uncovers the name Edgar Snow. An American-born journalist, Snow worked in China for a thirteen year period, the latter years of which gave him a very unique experience⁸. During 1936, Edgar Snow was able to visit the base area of the CCP in northern Shaanxi, which would be the site of his interview with Mao Tse Tung⁸. Throughout the course of his interview with Mao, Snow would record the details of Mao's formative years and later on combine this information with his experiences in Shaanxi to author the book Red Star over China⁸. This work did much in spreading a vision of Mao, which set Edgar Snow apart as the first Western journalist to be allowed access to the revolutionary stronghold in Shaanxi⁹. The central purpose of Red Star over China is as an expository piece attempting to bring light to the life of Mao and the birth

⁸ Mackerras, Colin. Western Images of China. Revised Edition. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999.

⁹ "Edgar Parks Snow (1905-1972) Papers." University of Missouri-Kansas City Archives July 5, 1994. <http://www.umkc.edu/University_Archives/INVTRY/EPS/EPS-INTRO.HTM#BIOGRAPHY>.

of the CCP, but Snow's work made more of an idealistic representation of the Communist forces rather than an attempt to spread the party's hard-line political message. Snow's image of Mao professed the revolutionary as "Chinese dedicated to national integrity and social justice."⁸ This gave Mao a great deal of legitimacy within both the multi-national Communist sphere and the upper intellectual echelons of Chinese society that had access to publications such as Snow's book.

Edgar Snow became world famous for his representation of Mao and the CCP and is widely credited for bringing greater renown to the revolution. This brings forth a fundamental question regarding the life and work of Philip Jaffe: While Edgar Snow was lauded with praise for his representations of Chinese communism and its leader Mao Tse Tung, why then is Jaffe forgotten by history for his confidential interview with Mao that detailed, at length, the stance and aspirations of the CCP? Were not both men individually responsible for facilitating the CCP's attempts to augment their political status through the mass publication of ideological propaganda? Although Edgar Snow was the first Western journalist to be given access to the CCP forces in Shaanxi and to give a face to the Communist movement, Jaffe's interview ventured into an otherwise ambiguous territory: the vast goals and plans of the CCP as detailed by its figurehead Mao Tse-tung. Jaffe's transcript humanizes Mao by obtaining an unadulterated look into his pragmatic and practical nature, aspects overlooked in Snow's more romanticized novel.

Beyond Snow, the two most respected and oft-published journalists were female authors Anna Louise Strong and Agnes Smedley, two of the very first to openly publish their pro-Communist tendencies within the framework of the Chinese state. The role of women in Chinese society had followed a long history of subjugation, so the idea that two foreign women might have a palpable influence on the course of China's history heightened the notoriety of Strong and Smedley. However, as addressed previously with Snow, what access was granted to the two women? In the case of Agnes Smedley, she spent a significant amount of time living alongside the Communists and was afforded the opportunity to meet CCP leaders Mao Tse-tung, Lin Biao, and Zhou Enlai.¹⁰ Although women were welcomed in the Communist revolution, they were often prevented from reaching positions of great significance, making Smedley's experiences even more extraordinary. While not attempting to diminish the magnitude of Agnes Smedley's career, or the incredible fact that her time spent with the resistance units of the KMT and CCP was the most extensive of any foreign correspondent regardless of sex¹¹, her work mainly regarded the proletariat class of China and their struggle (rather than the policies of the CCP). Anna Louise Strong, noting her limited time spent in China, was also able to meet CCP leaders during her stay. Most prominently, a conversation between Strong and Mao was recorded in Selected Works of Mao Zedong that gives a vital glimpse into the intentions of Strong regarding the Communist movement,

Strong: How long can the Communist Party keep on?

¹⁰ Roberts, Alice. "Agnes Smedley: 1892-1950." Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding. November 1972. SACU. 3 Apr 2007 <<http://www.sacu.org/smedley.html>>.

¹¹ "Daughter of Earth: Agnes Smedley Collection." Department of Archives and Manuscripts. Arizona State University. 3 Apr 2007 <<http://www.asu.edu/lib/archives/smedley.htm>>.

Mao: As far as our own desire is concerned, we don't want to fight even for a single day. But if circumstances force us to fight, we can fight to the finish.

Strong: If the American people ask why the Communist Party is fighting, what should I reply?

Mao: Because Chiang Kai-shek is out to slaughter the Chinese people, and if the people want to survive they have to defend themselves. This the American people can understand.¹²

In this dialogue, it is readily apparent that Mao's answers cling tightly to the propaganda diatribe of the CCP. Whereas an unbiased interviewer might further explore a line of questioning regarding Mao's declarations that the CCP has no desire for war and also that Chiang Kai-shek aims to "slaughter the Chinese people", Strong allows Mao to simply proceed and further dominate the discussion with Communist rhetoric. Without a doubt, Strong was sympathetic to Mao, the CCP, and Communist ideologies. Despite the fact that Philip Jaffe spent far less time within the borders of China than Agnes Smedley, and was not included in the volumes of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, it is more than unfortunate that his role has gone unappreciated by historians. At the very least, history should regard Philip Jaffe as an influential international voice for communism during the ideology's defining years. His necessity, along with the likes of Snow, Smedley, and Strong, was found in his ability to lend a voice to the "mass movement" of Mao and as a medium through which the CCP might spread their propagandized message.

In the course of this research, a great deal has come to light regarding the prior life and work of Philip Jaffe that was previously a source of uncertainty. From his highly educated American background Jaffe gained the critical thinking skills and writing expertise that would set him apart in his future endeavors. Jaffe's secondary education included time spent at the Lovestone School, during which he met and spent time with Jay Lovestone, the eventual General Secretary of the Communist Party USA.⁴ As previously mentioned, Jaffe had a close and sincere friendship with his cousin (through marriage) Chi Ch'ao-ting that led him to become increasingly active in both Communist and Socialist causes like that of the International Labor Defense.⁴ What Jaffe was able to maintain, even during his extensive operations within the ILD, was an objective viewpoint that allowed him to not be swept up by rhetoric from radical groups. Not until being named editor of *China Today* does Jaffe confess to having any interest in China, "Up to this time (of being named editor), I must confess that I had never had any particular interest in China. It began only through my friendship with my Chinese cousin."⁴ Accounting for this, Jaffe can now be further viewed as objective due to the fact that he was by no means a sinophile and was conscious of the radicalism surrounding him, "As I 'look back on us', I recognize that many still romanticize the radicalism of the thirties without acknowledging its absurdities, illusions and self-deceptions."⁴ This granted Jaffe a unique perspective on the Chinese revolution, enhancing his ability to view all aspects within the political scope. It is somewhat ironic then that Jaffe became an

¹² Tse-tung, Mao. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. 3rd. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969.

unofficial propagandist for the CCP; after his years of operating independently from the Communist Party USA he ventured to China only to cement his relationship with one of the world's largest Communist parties. From here, Jaffe's life becomes muddled by an almost complete lack of information. To construct an accurate representation of Jaffe's influence, his work must be viewed in contrast to those similarly classified.

One such historical player is the previously mentioned Edgar Snow. Returning to the work of Snow, it is of central importance to make further reference to his shining achievement, Red Star over China. Much of the reason for Snow's symbolic representation of Mao stems from his own fundamental Communist beliefs, which were clearly visible years later when he openly credited the CCP for correcting mistakes in Shanghai prior to their ascension to national power in 1949, "Gone the pompous wealth beside naked starvation...gone the island of Western civilization flourishing in the vast slum that was Shanghai. Good-by [sic] to all that."⁸ This fundamentalist mindset and Snow's inherent generosity in his descriptions of communism skew the narrative of Red Star over China and turns it into a subjective interpretation. Where Jaffe excels beyond Snow is in his ability to delve into volatile topics that test Mao's resolve and faithfulness to party propaganda:

Question: What political advantages were gained by foregoing the possibility of forming a united Northwestern Army during the Sian incident and after?

Answer: In the first place, China did not enter the Fascist front. Secondly, the work of unification of all patriotic forces in China to fight Japan achieved the first step toward success. Only by such a policy can China be saved.³

Within Mao's answer, the subtly contentious nature of the interview is evident as the CCP leader responds sharp and pointedly to Jaffe's line of questioning. Even though Jaffe was able to conduct an interview of such strategic importance, he never received recognition for his work, likely because he was traversing territory already illustrated by the work of Snow. Regardless of the shadow cast by Snow, it is not simply his work that overshadowed and excluded Jaffe from the chronicles of history.

Referring back to the explanations of Agnes Smedley and Anna Louis Strong's importance to China, the two women can be easily considered peers of Jaffe in their work and aspirations. However, while there were parallels in the aspirations of their individual work, the backgrounds of each formerly chronicled female journalist were highly oppositional. Agnes Smedley was raised in a very poor family, and it was her childhood experiences that led to her becoming a radical socialist and feminist.⁸ Although she was completely against the Jiangxi Soviet and the Red Army, Smedley held firmly to the belief that only the CCP could possibly incorporate all of the working class and increase the "productive or purchasing power of the Chinese masses."⁸ Quite contrarily, Anna Louise Strong came from a prosperous and highly educated background. Also, while Smedley and Snow spent limited time in China, Strong was able to actually live in the People's Republic of China.⁸ However, there are a few essential aspects of the two female author's lives that set Jaffe apart from their group of influential journalists. Whereas Smedley and Strong wrote extensively on Chinese Communism and supported

its aims, Jaffe was able to thoroughly involve himself in the sphere of information for the CCP. While his lack of experience in mainland China might be thought to have hampered his ability to impact the political atmosphere, the opportunity granted to Jaffe as editor of *China Today* and interview Mao Tse-tung suggest otherwise.

The close relationship Jaffe held with Chi Ch'ao-ting opened doors that promoted his experience beyond that of his peers. His future position within the KMT notwithstanding, Chi was credited by Jaffe as his most notable political influence,

“The beginning of Chi’s influence on my political future came at a crucial period in my life...Knowing of my political discontent and disorientation, Chi Ch’ao-ting said to me: now that you have tried them (Lovestoneites), why not try us (Communist Party USA)? Why not?”⁴

From then on, Jaffe’s political career climbed the ladder of the Communist spectrum. After joining the ILD and writing for their journal *Labor Defender*, Jaffe decided that he “had found a home on the American left—within the Communist world where...I had a captive audience for my writings and enjoyed the comfortable position of being surrounded by like-minded individuals.”⁴ The accolades Jaffe received for his work within the ILD led Chi to invite him to another political group: “The American Friends of the Chinese People,”⁴ which would become Jaffe’s foremost experience with Chinese politics. Following this meeting, he would receive a new position within his new special-interest group, “Except for me, all those present were obviously Communist Party members. Nevertheless, or perhaps because of this, soon after the meeting I became the Executive Secretary (of “The American Friends of the Chinese People”) and editor of its organ, *China Today*.”⁴ In a relatively short period of time, Philip Jaffe had risen through the ranks of American Communist political groups to become a leader and mouthpiece for the most direct link between American Communists and the CCP. At the height of his political involvement with Communism, Jaffe notes an experience which helped dissuade his former naïveté, “Indicative of the Communist Party’s control of intellectuals was the John Reed Club. I remember that at every meeting Alexander Trachtenberg and Fred Brown (Mario Alpi), representing the C.P. Politburo, were present to insure that the Marxism-Leninism discussed was true to the gospel. The Party couldn’t even trust its most loyal followers.”⁴ Jaffe was no longer ignorantly following the direction of communism by the time he became editor of *China Today*, and was even less so upon his founding of *Amerasia*.

China Today began as much less of a political commentary on Communist doctrine than a propaganda publication for use by the CCP. However, the original intent of the periodical would win out as Jaffe and his colleagues would transform it into the editorial work it eventually became. The same timeline cannot account for his work at *Amerasia*, as Jaffe himself would found the paper for the very purpose of editorial publication regarding the tumult of China, “But neither the Party, nor any other organization or individual was in a position to dictate to me what the character of *Amerasia* should be. On the contrary, I believe that I was scrupulous in protecting the political diversity of *Amerasia*’s editorial board.”⁴ This commentary by Jaffe may show as the most indicative of his highly independent and objective nature. Although the exact subscription numbers of *Amerasia* may appear rather inconsequential (about 1700 total

subscriptions at its peak⁴), it is imperative to not understate the periodical's importance. Of its total subscriptions, nearly one-third went to government agencies worldwide⁴. Likewise, when confronted with accusations of espionage within the *Amerasia* spy case, Jaffe's influence became much clearer. Due to published confidential U.S. government documents that held highly sensitive material regarding Asian affairs, Jaffe and five others were tried as spies¹³. After thorough investigation, Jaffe and his fellow defendants were found not-guilty of espionage and were released without any of the group seeing time in jail¹³. Throughout his career, especially as shown in the details of the *Amerasia* case and his interview with Mao Tse Tung, Jaffe seemed to have an uncanny knack for obtaining confidential information. The true impact of *Amerasia* creates an interesting parallel between Jaffe and one of his previously mentioned peers, "The most sensational and historically important (article) ever published in the eleven year run of *Amerasia* was "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" by Anna Louise Strong... This article led to Miss Strong's arrest in Moscow by Stalin in 1949 as a 'notorious American spy', which is a key to the Sino-Soviet dispute."⁴ With the next issue in July 1947, Jaffe was forced to cease publication of *Amerasia* due to his inability to keep it running with only a single fellow editor. After ceasing publication, the periodical's loyal readers expressed sorrow for its demise. It must also be noted that following the issue that included "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung", Jaffe was "excommunicated from the Communist world" for both the article's content and his notable division from Communist policies.⁴ The late 1940s can be seen as the period in which Jaffe began to remove himself from the political spectrum. A once fervent Communist intellectual, he had become disillusioned with the Party's aims both in China and on the international stage.

Throughout each juncture of Jaffe's political career, there exists a multitude of parallels between his work and that of his Communist-sympathetic peers. From his initial involvement in the ILD, which led to a rapid rise through the ranks of the organization, he showed a flair for affairs of state that set him apart from the radical wings of communism. He understood the intricate necessity for new ideas and questioning one's own ideological attitudes in deciding his own doctrine of belief. Reflected in the strained discourse between himself and Mao Tse-tung, Jaffe was not a blind sheep aimlessly following rhetoric. Rather, Jaffe openly questioned the aspirations of the CCP's leader:

Question: Does not acceptance of Nanking as leader of the national forces tend to confuse the students and other mass organizations? What lines of action can be laid down to avoid this difficulty?

Answer: We are convinced that the students and masses will see clearly the whole situation and will have no doubt of the success of the Communist policy. The masses will have no doubt about the question of leadership.³

This exchange between him and Mao illuminates editorial aspects of Jaffe's personality, while further expounding his significance. Without question, Philip Jaffe was an important player on the international Communist stage. His work on the Chinese

¹³ Klehr, Harvey. "The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism." The American Political Science Review Vol. 91, No. 309 1997 747. 17 04 2007 <<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199709%2991%3A3%3C747%3ATASCPT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q>>.

Communist movement while in China influenced both the CCP and its followers, whereas his work in America dealt heavily with the political climate and discourse regarding China's budding civil war. Through his highly notable contacts, Jaffe was able to expand his elaborate knowledge of China and its philosophical tumult. By fusing this depth of knowledge with his vast experiences within government, communism, and journalism, Jaffe worked assiduously toward making his name known in intellectual circles. From his work on *China Today*, originally a formidable mouthpiece for CCP propaganda, to his foundation of *Amerasia*, an editorial periodical that sought to inform its readers about the Chinese situation (with an obvious sympathetic stance toward Chinese Communism), Philip Jaffe was successful in his work aiding communism in China and abroad while adapting his own beliefs to his life experiences. Even beyond the sphere of Communist intellectualism, Jaffe's work and name were held in the highest regard. At the end of *Amerasia*'s publication life, Jaffe was sent this expression of sorrow:

Over the years, although it [*Amerasia*] has often presented opinions and interpretations with which I could not agree, I have enjoyed and profited by reading it and I have found it useful for purposes of reference. I regret its discontinuance.⁴

These words were sent to Jaffe by Stanley K. Hornbeck on April 21, 1948, acting Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department within the United States' government, only three years after the *Amerasia* spy case that saw the editors of the periodical accused of espionage. With this final declaration by a politician that could hardly be defined as an ally, Jaffe was left with a visible and undeniable mark of his work's importance. What began as a naïve expedition into the world of politics in order to discover his own political bearings eventually became something Jaffe never sought: a highly unique account of a foreigner's indelible impact on the course of Chinese and Communist history.